A state school system should be expected to reduce income inequality and to make intergenerational mobility easier. It is therefore somewhat surprising to observe that Italy, in comparison to the US, displays less inequality between occupational incomes but a lower degree of intergenerational upward mobility not only between occupations but also between education levels. In this paper we provide evidence on this empirical puzzle and we o®er one theoretical explanation building around the idea that even if in Italy moving up the social ladder is easier, the incentive to move may be lower making mobility less likely.
Introduction An empirical puzzle
The Italian schooling system can be characterised as a prevalently centralised and public system¯nanced by the government through taxation, that provides the same quality of education to everybody. The US system, instead, can be characterised as a prevalently decentralised and private system in the sense that public education is mainly¯nanced at the local level and the share of students going to private school is substantially higher.
Given this characterisation, an Italian family at a low level of income (which can re°ect a low level of acquired human capital) should have the same level of education available as a higher income family. A US low income (and low human capital) family, instead should have the additional disadvantage of a low expense in education decided by parents (as a result of a lower direct investment or because of locational choices in communities in which preferences are for lower tax rates and worse schooling institutions).
1 Within this framework it would seem reasonable to predict for Italy a more compressed distribution of human capital investments (and therefore of incomes) matched by a higher likelihood of upward mobility for poor families.
Comparative empirical evidence on Italy and the US, described in Section 2, suggests that this is not the case. While Italy seems characterised by less income inequality, standard measures of intergenerational mobility between occupations and between education levels indicate that poor and non-educated families are less likely to invest in the education of their children and to move up along the occupational ladder. In other words, the Italian centralised public education system can be characterised as an o®er of equal opportunities that surprisingly has not been accepted by the Italian poor families. This is the puzzle that we would like to address and explain in our paper.
A possible explanation: the role of talent and self con¯dence.
We propose a theoretical model which can shed some light on this empirical puzzle and, more generally, on the relation between income inequality and intergenerational mobility.
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Our model builds on existing ones (in particular Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) ) but adds an important element: people have talent, which is an essential requirement in the acquisition of human capital. The consideration of talent is what makes the problem of mobility interesting from an economic point of view: without mobility a society may assign high talented people to low education groups, and people with low talent to high education groups; this is an 1 See Benabou (1996a) . 2 This relation has been surprisingly somewhat neglected in the literature. An important exception is represented by the work of Anthony Atkinson (in particular, Atkinson, 1980-81 and Atkinson, 1983 who takes up the challenge posed in Pen (1971) to \build a bridge between the¯gures on vertical mobility and income distribution". More recently, see also the model proposed by Galor and Tsiddon (1996) in which, inequality and intergenerational mobility are positively correlated and driven by the pace of technological innovations.
undesirable feature of an immobile society. 3 Talent is transmitted from father to son with some persistence and cannot be directly observed. 4 The only test for talent is the performance at school. If someone attempts to acquire education, and succeeds, he has a high talent; while, if he fails, he has a low talent. Therefore, school as a sorting mechanism only works for those who chose to invest in human capital. Since talent is imperfectly observable, each person can only try to make some inference about it from the family history.
So the most important decisions, in particular those determining the investment in human capital, are taken on the basis of the belief that each person has on his own talent. The higher this belief, the more likely a person is to invest in education: in fact we shall see that the rational decision is to invest in education if and only if the subjective belief of having the necessary talent is higher than a critical threshold. We refer to this as the self con¯dence factor, 5 although we have to remember that it is a perfectly rational consideration, since this belief summarises all the information a person has about his own talent.
This belief becomes an important way in which family background a®ects the decision of a child. A family may be stuck at low levels of education for a sequence of periods because the previous family experiences have given to its members a low con¯dence. Therefore, a fraction of the population has high talent, but does not use it, because of the adverse belief. We say that a society is more mobile if a larger fraction of the people in the low income group makes an e®ort to increase personal income through an educational investment. The key issue that we analyse in this paper is: which institutional setup for schooling (centralised and public vs. decentralised and private) makes a society more mobile in the above sense, and why. Given this characterisation of mobility, it is desirable to increase it if one wants to reduce the probability that talented individuals remain stuck with low human capital.
In a public school system in which a uniform education quality is o®ered to everyone, the combination of taxes and educational expenditures transfers revenues from high income families to low income families, and makes a better education available to the latter, at no additional cost. In a private school system a higher income makes the choice of a higher education easier; so income inequality tends to persist. The transfer of resources induced by the state system and commonly quoted in its support, creates indeed an important incentive for low income families to increase their human capital and tends to raise the degree of mobility induced by public education.
There are however other factors, which go in the opposite direction. 3 We are here speaking loosely on purpose: the full analysis of the implications of our model for welfare and e±ciency is beyond the goals of the present paper. We think, however, that our model provides the necessary structure for an interesting discussion of these issues, so far largely disregarded in the literature on social mobility (particularly in the sociological contributions). We leave such discussion for future research. 4 Talent should be interpreted as the combination of the genetic and environmental transfers from parents to children; so the assumption of persistence is plausible independently of any belief on genetic transmission. As we will see, without persistence the problem of mobility becomes trivial and our model features perfect mobility independently of the schooling system. 5 A factor to which, surprisingly, Herrnstein and Murray (1994) devote no time in their book \The Bell Curve".
First, in a private system, a higher parental income directly increases the amount of resources available for the education of the son, while it does not in a public system. If people are altruists, this adds to the attractiveness of a higher education because one knows that if the investment in human capital is successful he will be able to transfer more resources to the next generation; in a public system, the educational transfer to the next generation is centrally determined independently of parental income. Second, a single tax rate may force some parents to a rate of expenditures in education lower than they would desire, thereby making less likely an otherwise attractive investment in education for their sons. Finally, the fact that the tax rate is unique makes useless any information that a person may acquire on his and his son's personal abilities, because he cannot adjust the expense in education for the son according to this information.
Our explanation of the puzzle o®ered by the comparative evidence on education¯nancing and intergenerational mobility in Italy and in the US hinges on the role of the factors outlined above. In principle, a centralised public system could ensure more mobility than a decentralised private system if the redistribution factor prevails on the others. But the main goal of our model is to show that the opposite outcome is also possible for reasonable values of the relevant parameters. And the comparative evidence on Italy and the US is there to motivate this¯nding and to prove that it is not just a theoretical possibility with little empirical value.
Of course in a more general model capable, for example, to incorporate the e®ects highlighted in Benabou (1996a) and (1996b), and in Fernandez and Rogerson (1996) 6 the balance would probably be more favourable to the capacity of a centralised state school system to increase mobility; but the basic trust of our paper would not change: a public and centralised education system introduces distortions in a market economy that societies are usually willing to accept, among other reasons, in order to reduce the probability of leaving talented children stuck in low occupations; our empirical evidence and our model show that this positive outcome is not a necessary consequence of a centralised public education system.
Our model draws on the basic structure of Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) , but adds to it the consideration of mobility by focusing on the role of talent and self-con¯dence as determinants of human capital investment decisions. This is an issue that they do not address but that is crucial for an exhaustive comparison of the e®ects of centralised/public versus decentralised/private education systems. In their model the predicted mobility is necessarily zero, since a dynasty which has an income higher than another in the initial period has a higher income forever. The reason of the di®erence is clear: in the model of Glomm and Ravikumar there is no talent, persistent or i.i.d..
We, therefore, complement their analysis in a crucial way by showing under what conditions a centralised state system, even if it reduces aggregate human capital accumulation, may be desirable from the point of view of mobility, i.e. from the point of view of reducing the probability that talented individuals remain stuck in low occupations. But we also show that even this desirable property of a centralised public education system is not granted in principle: under plausible conditions, such a system may be inferior to a decentralised 6 See also the insightful survey by Bertola and Coen-Pirani (1995) . private one even from the point of view of mobility.
After the description of the motivating facts concerning mobility and educational institutions in Italy and in the US provided in section 2, in sections 3 and 4 we present the model, the implied equilibria and the steady state distributions. In section 5 we propose some unconventional measures of mobility suggested by the theoretical model. In section 6 we describe and comment the results of numerical computations of the possible equilibria under the two schooling systems. Concluding remarks follow.
Evidence on the puzzle Occupational mobility
Social mobility is de¯ned and measured in many di®erent ways in the literature. Among economists, some authors focus on transitions between income classes or between percentiles of the income distribution (Atkinson (1980-81) ) while others look at the speed of mean regression of incomes across generations (Becker and Tomes (1986) , Solon (1992) , Zimmerman (1992)); among sociologist, instead, the attention is concentrated on transitions between occupations ranked according to social prestige (Treiman and Ganzeboom (1990) ) or on the transitions between social classes (Erickson and Goldthorpe (1992) ). In general while economists tend to study mobility in terms of incomes, sociologists are more likely to focus on occupations.
Our approach can be characterised as a sort of intermediate third way that we adopt partly because of data limitations 7 but also because it o®ers some advantages from the point of view of achieving a meaningful international comparison and complements in an hopefully interesting way the existing literature. Sociologists have since long argued that because of temporary income°uctuations and measurement error, mobility in terms of yearly income is a misleading upwardly biased indicator of mobility if the goal is to measure transitions between long term economic status. Casting this argument in an econometric framework, Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992) propose averages of individual incomes on subsequent years as measures of long term status, but we cannot follow their suggestion because we do not have the necessary information for Italy. We take instead a road more familiar to sociologists and focus on occupations as indicators of economic status; but, we also depart from the sociological literature because we do not rank occupations according to social prestige nor we aggregate them according to subjectively de¯ned social classes.
Given the information contained in our datasets the concept of social mobility that we can measure is represented by mobility between occupations ranked according to the median income paid by each occupation in the generation of children in each country. 8 The reader should therefore keep in mind that in this study, a dynasty is classi¯ed as mobile only if 7 See the Appendix 8.1 8 We also performed our analysis using sociological indexes of prestige to rank occupations, but our results concerning the relative performance the two countries in terms of occupational mobility does not change. We present the evidence based on income ranking because it is less conventional from a methodological point the occupation of the son is di®erent from the occupation of the father. Take the case of a father and a son in the same occupation, which is highly paid in relative terms when the father is observed but that is paid less than average when the son is observed. According to our de¯nition this dynasty is classi¯ed as immobile even if, in terms of individual incomes, it experiences downward mobility. Income changes that take place within the same occupation but across generations cannot be measured in our datasets and do not imply mobility according to our de¯nition. Viceversa, the case of a father and a son possibly earning the same incomes but working in two di®erent occupations is considered here as a case of intergenerational mobility. Therefore, intergenerational mobility in this study has to be interpreted as mobility between occupations even if occupations are ranked on the basis of incomes.
With this caveat in mind we begin our analysis with the evidence on inequality. The existence of greater labour income inequality in the US in comparison to Italy, has been already documented in the literature 9 and is con¯rmed in the datasets used in this study: as shown in Table 2 , within each generation all the most common indicators of income inequality proposed in the literature are clearly larger in the US sample.
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Less documented, is instead the comparative evidence on intergenerational social mobility for Italy and the US. Tables 4 and 5 present the matrices of transition between occupational income classes de¯ned as proportions of equal size of the (log) di®erence between the highest and the lowest occupational incomes in the two countries (see table 3 ). According to this aggregation strategy, in each country these classes span over the same percentage increase in occupational incomes.
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Di®erences between the two countries are apparent from the simple inspection of these transition matrices: in particular, the probabilities of persistence along the main diagonal are larger in Italy for the three upper classes. The fact that persistence in the¯rst class is instead higher in the US may be interpreted as evidence on the role of \ghettos" in this latter country. But the probability to reach the two highest classes from the bottom is higher in the US (37.7%) than in Italy (27.7%) while the probability of persistence in the top class is higher in this latter country (47.3% against 38.7%). If one computes on the basis of these matrices the most standard scalar indicators of mobility that have been proposed of view and because it allows for an analysis of the relation between educational mobility and occupational mobility. Such analysis is impossible if occupations are ranked according to indicators of prestige constructed on the basis of educational achievements.
9 See, for example: Gottshalk and Smeeding (1995) and Erickson and Ichino (1994) . 10 For a description of these indicators see the appendix of the CEPR WP version of this paper (n. 1466, October 1996). Given that in each country occupational incomes for both generations are computed on the distribution of children, inequality di®ers across generations only because of changes in the distribution of each generation across occupations. 11 We obtain similar results with di®erent aggregation strategies, like for example the aggregation based on quartiles of the occupational income distribution (see the CEPR WP version of this paper, n. 1466, October 1996 ). We prefer the aggregation based on the income classes described in the text because, given the skewness of the income distribution, quartiles (in particular the fourth) may group together very disomogeneous occupational incomes. Therefore similar transitions in terms of quartiles may mean very di®erent transitions in terms of occupational incomes. Furthermore, the focus on absolute instead of relative transitions is consistent with the theoretical analysis presented in section 3. in the literature, 12 the US appear unambiguously characterised by greater intergenerational mobility (see Table 6 ).
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In order to determine whether intergenerational mobility is signi¯cantly di®erent in a statistical sense in Italy and in the US, we aggregate the four income classes de¯ned above in two groups and we estimate a probit model of the probability that the son is in the highest of these two groups. We de¯ne the highest group as the union of the classes 3 and 4 that were described in tables 3. Hence, the dependent variable of our probit models takes value 1 if the son is in income class 3 or 4, i.e. if his occupational income is greater than the income corresponding to one half the percentage di®erence between the maximum and the minimum of the distribution of occupational incomes. We estimate this probability as a function of a dummy indicator for the income group of fathers (that takes value 1 if the father is in income class 3 or 4) and of two dummy indicators for the education levels of fathers and sons. In both generations and in both countries the education indicators take value 1 if the individual has a college degree. Age controls are also included in the regressions.
The results of this exercise are presented in table 7 that reports, for each regression, the change in the probability that the son is in the highest group due to a change from 0 to 1 of each independent dummy variable.
14 These e®ects are evaluated at sample averages. In model 1 only the family background variables are included as regressors: while the e®ect of father's education is equal in the two countries, the e®ects of father's income class is signi¯cantly larger in Italy.
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In model 2 the education dummy for the son is introduced, and the e®ect of fathers' education disappears in both countries: this is a well known result in the literature 16 and suggests that most of the e®ect of parental education on sons' occupational achievements works indirectly through the e®ects on son's education. The e®ect of the occupational income class of fathers, however, remains signi¯cantly di®erent from zero in both countries, and signi¯cantly larger in Italy than in the US. While in the US the e®ect of sons' education is larger than the e®ect of parental income, in Italy the opposite is true. To put it more directly, in Italy it is better to ... chose the right family than to reach a college degree.
Coming to the comparison between model 2 and model 3, in both countries a likelihood ratio test rejects the hypothesis that family background is irrelevant. Yet, while in Italy the value of the test (3 degrees of freedom) is 98.1 in the US it is equal to 38.1: i.e. the null hypothesis of no background e®ect is rejected with greater con¯dence in Italy. Furthermore, adding parental characteristics to sons characteristics (i.e. going from model 3 to model 2) Atkinson (1983) , Bartholomew (1982) , Sommers and Conlisk (1979) , Shorrocks (1978) , Geweke et al. (1986) , Conlisk (1989) , Conlisk (1990) and Dardanoni (1992) . 13 For a description of these indicators, see the appendix of the CEPR WP version of this paper (n. 1466, October 1996).
14 For the age controls the reported e®ect is the e®ect of an in¯nitesimal age increase. 15 Here and for the rest of this table, di®erences between coe±cients have been tested using appropriately constructed t-tests; the null hypothesis of equal coe±cients has been rejected with p-values smaller than .001. 16 See for example Treiman and Yip (1989) .
increases the predictive capacity (pseudo R2) of the model by 150% in Italy; in the US the increase is much lower being equal to just 19%. The probit estimates presented in Table 7 con¯rm that intergenerational mobility between occupations is signi¯cantly lower in Italy than in the US: in both countries the occupational class of fathers is an important determinant of the occupational class of sons, but in Italy the e®ect is much stronger than in the US in absolute terms and relatively to the e®ect of sons' education levels.
We turn now to the evidence on intergenerational mobility between education levels in which the relative lack of upward mobility in Italy appears even more striking given the prevalently public and centralised structure of the Italian schooling system.
Educational Mobility
The comparison across countries of educational mobility patterns is certainly not an easy task given the enormous di®erences between national education systems. 17 One strategy that seems to us reasonable consists in comparing the probabilities of reaching the highest educational degree o®ered by the schooling system of each country. Disregarding post graduate studies, that both in Italy and in the US concern a very small fraction of the population, we consider the college degree (laurea in Italy) as the relevant highest educational degree.
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We therefore begin our analysis of educational mobility by considering the probabilities of dynastic transitions between the following two educational categories: all the individuals without a college degree are classi¯ed as having low education, while those holding a college degree are in the high education group. Table 8 presents the distribution across these educational categories in each generation and in each country. Italy is characterised in both generations by a lower fraction of college graduates, but experiences the largest percentage shift towards higher education from one generation to the other: while in the US the fraction of graduates increase by 69% in Italy the same fraction increases by 200%. Yet not all Italian dynasties shared in the same way this greater opportunity to reach a college degree. Tables 9 and 10 present, for Italy and for the US respectively, the intergenerational transition probabilities between the educational categories that we have just described. In Italy, the probability that the son of a graduate is a graduate is higher than in the US (65.1% vs. 61.0%); viceversa the probability that the son of non-graduate reaches a college degree is substantially lower in Italy than in the US (7.1% vs. 20.8%). The inspection of these transition probabilities clearly suggests that the opportunities of reaching a college degree are more unequally distributed in Italy than in the US, even if Italy experiences a more substantial increase of the proportion of college graduates from one generation to the other.
The odds ratios for the two transition matrices, reported in Table 12 , show that the odds of reaching a college degree are in Italy almost 25 times higher if the father has a college degree, while in the US having a graduate father increases the odds only by 6 times. Hence, both countries do not ensure a situation of equal opportunities in the transitions between education levels, but Italy appears to be more distant than the US from such a situation. This is con¯rmed also by the other scalar indicators contained in Table 12 .
One might argue that a college degree means more in Italy than in the US in terms of human capital acquisition. Indeed at least one additional year of schooling is required in Italy to obtain a laurea and in some disciplines, like engineering or medicine, the laurea involves educational curricula that in the US are required for post graduate studies only. Therefore, as far as Italy is concerned, we provide evidence also for a di®erent classi¯cation of educational categories according to which the high education group includes all the individuals that have reached a high school degree or more. Table 8 shows that with this alternative classi¯cation Italy is characterised by an even larger increase of the fraction of highly educated dynasties (262%); furthermore, among sons, the proportion of highly educated individuals in Italy (high school or more) becomes similar to the proportion of highly educated individuals in the US (college or more).
Yet even with such a favourable classi¯cation, the opportunities of reaching the higher educational category are more unequally distributed in Italy than in the US (see table 12 ). The odds of reaching a high school degree or more are now even larger if the father is in the same educational category (the odds ratio is 27.3) and the distance from a situation of equal opportunities increases with respect to the previous classi¯cation (see the indicator M T in table 12).
19
Education in the two countries: centralisation vs. decentralisation
The evidence that we presented so far shows undoubtedly that Italy features more equality between occupational incomes but also lower intergenerational mobility in terms of occupations and education levels. It seems fair to say that family background is a more important determinant of individual social fortunes in Italy than in the US. These results are apparently surprising given the centralised and public nature of the Italian education system relatively to the US one. Such a di®erent nature, that should have increased the equality of educational and occupational opportunities in Italy, is clearly evident in several aspects of the schooling institutions of the two countries.
A¯rst fundamental di®erence is that while both countries spend a similar fraction of GNP on public education, 20 the sources of public funding are very di®erent. In Italy, 79% of public expenditures for primary and secondary education comes from the central government 19 Only the Bartholomew index of movement M B indicates more mobility for Italy with this alternative educational classi¯cation, but this should not be surprising given that MB is an indicator of movement not an indicator of equality of opportunities ( see the appendix of the CEPR WP version of this paper, n. 1466, October 1996 ); its value is driven by the structural shift towards higher education that characterised Italy in the post-war period, but it hides the existence of unequal opportunities. 20 In 1990, the incidence of public expenditures for education on GNP was 5.2% in Italy and 5.3% in the US; the¯gures for previous years are slightly lower but similar in both countries. Data from OECD (1995) and US Education Department (1995).
as opposed to local authorities, whereas in the US only 7.6% of these expenditures is centrallȳ nanced at the federal level and as much as 44.7% is¯nanced instead at the local level (city or county).
21 This is a crucial di®erence from the point of view of this paper: in the US, independently of how much funding comes from private sources, also public education should increase the role of family background as a determinant of educational decisions because of the e®ect of parental locational choices in communities characterised by di®erent combinations of local tax rates, housing prices and quality of schooling institutions. As we have shown above, however, the role of family background is instead surprisingly more important in Italy where education is not only¯nanced mainly out of public sources but these sources are also strictly controlled by the central government.
In addition to this fundamental di®erence, several other institutional features of the two systems emphasize centralisation in Italy and decentralisation in the US. For example, the age of compulsory education that is determined by a law at the parliamentary level in Italy, while in the US is dictated at the state level, ranging between 8 and 13 years, with an average of 10.05 years and a standard deviation of 1.19 years. 22 Furthermore, in Italy the types of educational curricula available in both private and public schools are established by a parliamentary law at the central level. For each type and level of schooling the parliament establishes also the subjects that have to be taught, the outlines of teaching programs for each subject, the textbooks prices (for compulsory education), the evaluation and grading methods and even the daily time of entrance and exit from school and vacation periods. Therefore, for example, a parliamentary vote is in principle needed to authorise a school not to teach a given subject or to teach a di®erent new one. At a di®erent but still centralised level, the Minister of Education issues approximately six hundred documents (circolari ministeriali) each year in which additional instructions are given to teachers and headmasters with the precise goal of making the education system as uniform as possible over the entire country. As a result, for each level and type of school¯nal exams are uniformly de¯ned, and in particular for the highschool degree the written exam questions are identical for all students and administered in the same day over the entire country. Note that also private school have to obey these laws and regulations if they want to obtain legal value for the degrees that they o®er.
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The recruitment of teachers is also completely centralised in Italy, with uniform requirements for each type and level of education: aspirant teachers have to compete in national competitions and to pass similar¯nal exams in order to be authorised to teach (this happens also for university professors). The teacher's salaries are centrally determined on the basis of seniority and of level of schooling, with basically no room for individually based di®erentiation.
At the other extreme, the US public education system is far from featuring a similar e®ort aimed at centralising and making as uniform as possible any aspect of the educational 21 Figures for 1992 taken from OECD (1995). 22 See law n.1859, 31/12/1962 for Italy and US Education Department (1995) for the US. 23 See, for example, the Italian Law DL 297 16/4/94, \Testo unico delle disposizioni legislative vigenti in materia di istruzione, relative alle scuole di ogni ordine e grado".
process. Where the US system comes closer to centralisation is in the requirement of standard uniform exams for admissions to higher levels of schooling. But these exams are not imposed by any law and, paradoxically, they are probably the most explicit indication of the degree of decentralisation and di®ormity of the educational curricula o®ered by US schools.
The decentralisation of public education¯nancing in the US makes the quantity and moreover the quality of public education available to a child heavily dependent on the locational choices and on the income of the family of origin. But in addition to the possibility of choosing the quality of public education \with their feet", US families have also the option of a well established private education system particularly at the university level. The proportions of students enrolled in private schools in Italy are 8.1%, 7.8% and 3.5% respectively for primary, secondary and tertiary education; in the US the analogous proportions are higher, being equal, respectively to 12.0%, 9.1% and 21.8%. The di®erence is particularly striking for tertiary education. 24 Furthermore, in the US the proportion of public sources in the expenditures for tertiary education is only 56.2% (in 1991); analogous¯gures for Italy are not available but given that the number of private Italian universities can be counted on thē ngers of one hand, we suspect that the proportion of public funding for tertiary education is much higher in this latter country.
Therefore in addition to the crucial e®ect of the decentralisation of public education funding and regulations, the di®erentiation of educational curricula in the US is strengthened by the greater di®usion of private schools. It is of course di±cult to measure how much the decentralisation of funding for public education and the greater di®usion of private schools result into an e®ectively more disomogeneous quality of education provided by the US system. It may be indicative, however, to observe that while the coe±cient of variation across the 20 Italian regions of the pupil-to-teachers average ratios is 6.5% (for primary and secondary education) the correspondent coe±cient of variation across US states is 13.2%.
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The standard errors of (comparable across countries) textscores for reading and narrative capabilities are respectively 3.4 and 3.6 in Italy and 4.8 and 4.9 in the US. 26 This evidence, albeit certainly not conclusive, is consistent with the view that the centrally funded and centrally administered Italian public education system provides a quality of education that is more uniform than the quality provided by the decentralised and more largely private US system.
In the following section we will show with the help of a theoretical model why and how these institutional features of the two educational systems may explain the di®erent degrees of occupational and educational mobility in the two countries. Our proposed explanation is certainly not the only one. In the Italian debate, for example, it has been argued quite convincingly 27 that barriers to entry/exit into/from certain occupations might also explain the lack of mobility in Italy. The data currently available to us are not rich enough to show, in a comparable way across countries, whether the existence of non-competitive labour markets is the crucial factor driving the observed di®erences in mobility patterns. 28 However, the existence of a prevalently public and centralised education system in Italy should have at least partially compensated for the lack of incentives to upward mobility induced by the labour market. On the contrary we observe that also educational mobility (in particular upward mobility) is substantially lower in Italy than in the US.
In the next section we suggest, that some intrinsic features of a public and centralised education system may cause lower intergenerational mobility independently of the labour market. These perverse e®ects have contributed together with the existence of non-competitive labour markets to cause the existence of lower intergenerational mobility in Italy, particularly between education levels. Given the current world-wide debate on the reform of public education we think it is important to highlight the possible role of these undesirable features of centralised and public school systems.
The Model Human Capital and Wages
Population is a continuum, each person lives for two periods and is productive only in the second. His production depends on his human capital, which is described by a real number h. He earns a wage equal to h. There are in¯nitely many periods; in each period t the distribution of human capital is denoted by G t ; the total human capital is therefore:
The Technology for Human Capital
Each person has a basic working ability, of quality normalised to 1, and a natural talent, which has no direct productive use, but is critical in acquiring additional human capital. Talent is denoted by a 2 fL; Hg; it is transmitted from father to son with some persistency. More precisely, talent follows a¯rst order Markov process:
with ® 2 (0; 1=2). Talent is not always known exactly: we denote by º t the belief that the talent of the member born at t of the dynasty is H.
A higher human capital can be produced by the combination of a learning e®ort, the help of an educational system, and the direct or indirect contribution of the human capital of the father. We assume that this is possible only if the talent of the person is of the high type. The technology has (as in Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) ) a Cobb Douglas functional form. More precisely,
where n t is the leisure enjoyed, e t is the quality of education, and h t is the human capital of the father.
Talent cannot be directly observed; the only way to determine it is to put it to the test of the education system. If the person decides to go to school, and fails, then he knows his talent was low; on the contrary if he succeeds he knows that it was high.
Preferences
The utility of each person depends on leisure of the¯rst period, denoted by n t , consumption of the second period c t+1 , and a term which describes the expected utility from the quality of the education which is left to the son. The expectation is taken with respect to the belief º t+1 that the person has on his son's talent, which is not known with certainty. Formally: U (n t ; c t+1 ; º t+1 ; e t+1 ) = log n t + log c t+1 + º t+1 log e t+1 (3.
2)
The budget constraint of each person will depend on the institutional arrangement for the provision of education: so we shall deal with it in the next section.
Two Institutions for Education Financing
As in Glomm and Rawikumar (1992) we consider two di®erent possible institutional arrangements for the provision of education, that is in the context of our model, for the determination of the quantity e t . The¯rst is a purely private regime, where e t is decided by the father, and paid out of his income. The second regime is a pure state school system. The quality of education provided to each child is the same, and is decided as follows. A tax rate ¿ 2 [0; 1] is voted in each period, and chosen according to majority rule. The tax rate applied to the total income gives an amount spent on the collective education:
We can now state the budget constraint formally. In the case of a private school system, the individual is facing the two constraints:
while in the case of the public school system, with tax rate ¿ t+1 , we have:
The Timing
The life of each person lasts for only two periods. A person born at date t knows the history of attempts to get an education and of successes and failures of former members of his dynasty. In the private school system, he also knows the amount that the father has devoted to his education; while in the state school system he knows the prevailing level of educational quality of the system. On the basis of the history of his dynasty he now computes his belief on his own talent, denoted by º t . 29 He then decides whether to go or not to go to school, a choice which is denoted as the choice between a Y or a N respectively. If he decides Y , he also decides the amount of e®ort he devotes to the learning activity. He then goes to school, and this is the end of the¯rst period.
At time t + 1 the talent of the person is revealed and h t+1 is determined. In the state school system the tax rate ¿ t+1 is then voted by the old generation. Then the remaining income is consumed and taxes are paid, or, in the private school system, the amount e t+1 of funds for the education of the son is provided. Then the son is born and the life of the older generation ends. Note that, to simplify notation, generations do not overlap in this model, but in each calendar period both generations are alive: the oldest in the¯rst part and the youngest in the second part of the period.
To summarise, and to clarify the informational restrictions for the agents: the decision about the education (that is, whether to go to school, and if so how much e®ort to spend in education) is taken without knowledge of the talent of the person; the vote on taxes, the consumption decision, and the amount for the education of the son, are decided after the additional information on the talent of the person has been obtained. 29 Note that at the moment of deciding about schooling, each person learns about his talent from his family history, but not from his performance in the early stages of his education. This is clearly an extreme assumption. We have two reasons to defend it. The¯rst is that some of the important decisions about schooling are taken at the very early stages of the education. For instance, the quality of the elementary education is important, and has sometimes decisive in°uence on future choices. The second reason is that we can easily think of a richer model where, say, each agent makes successive choices in education, and receives at each step a signal correlated with his talent from his performance. This model would yield the same qualitative results as ours (provided, of course, that these signals are not too precise). In other words, we want to focus here on the e®ects of past family experiences on the choice of a person and we claim that our model and its results are robust to the introduction of the possibility of learning from personal experience 30 For a discussion of the paradox of voting within this framework, see the CEPR WP version of this paper, n. 1466, October 1996.
Learning about talent
Consider a person with an initial belief º on his own talent. If he decides to go to school and he is succesful, he will change to 1 the belief on himself while the belief on the talent of his son wil be 1 ¡ ® . After a failure in school, instead, these two beliefs will be respectively 0 and ®.
If the person decides not to go to school, then he will gather no information about his own talent and will have a beliefô´®
on the talent of the son. We shall denote byô i the ith iterate of the function de¯ned in 3.4; note that this function is increasing in º, and its iterates converge to the value 1=2 independently of the initial value. Since, the belief of the¯rst member that follows a failure in school is º = ®, the belief of the ith member of the dynasty not going to school after a failure is:
The Optimal Policies
We begin with the case of the private school system. The optimal policy is decided by backward induction from the second period, after the decision between Y or N has been taken (and, in the case of a decision Y , the amount of leisure n t has been chosen). In the second period we have therefore three possible cases: Y and a success, Y and a failure, and N . In each of these cases the problem of the agent is to maximize for a given human capital h t+1 and belief º t+1 on the talent of the son:
log c t+1 + º t+1 log e t+1 ; subject to c t+1 + e t+1 · h t+1 :
which has an optimal e t+1 equal to:
and value:
where the function L is de¯ned in the appendix 8.3. So the optimal expense in case of a Y decision and a success is e t+1 = 1¡® 1+(1¡®) h t+1 ; in the case of Y and failure we have: e t+1 = ® 1+® h t+1 ; and¯nally, if the decision has been N , and the belief on his own talent was º, then: e t+1 =ô 1+ô :
In the case of the state system, the important decision in the second period is the one about voting, since consumption is a pure residual from income after payment of taxes. The optimal tax rate ¿ t+1 is º t+1 1 + º t+1 :
So in the three cases corresponding to the one described above for the private system case we have:
; and ¿ t+1 =ô 1+ô respectively. We can now solve the problem of deciding in the¯rst period the pair (Y; n t ) (go to school, with e®ort n t ), versus N . Leaving the details to the appendix 8.3, in order to understand the optimal policies in the two systems it may be helpful to focus on three generations, each one living for two periods: the grandfather, born at t ¡ 1, the father, born at t, who is the agent whose two periods decisions are being modelled, and the son, born at t + 1.
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In the private system the optimal choice of expenditure for education of the father is a function of the father's belief on the son's talent, and of the father's realised human capital; we denote this function by e P t+1 (º t+1 ; h t+1 ). Furthermore, the father's optimal choice of Y versus N , and of e®ort in school, is a function of the human capital of the grandfather and of the avilable quality of education (decided by the grandfather); we denote this function, that will have to be positive for a father to go to school, by D P t+1 (º t ; e t ; h t ). Similarly in the state system, the optimal father's vote on taxes is a function of the father's belief on the son's talent; we denote this function with ¿ S t+1 (º t+1 ). Furthermore, the fathers's optimal choice of Y versus N , and of e®ort in school, is a function of the human capital of the grandfather and of the average quality of education available to the father in the state system, e S t : We denote this function, that will have to be positive for a father to go to school, by D S t+1 (º t ; e S t ; h t ).
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Both functions D P t+1 (º t ; e t ; h t ) and D S t+1 (º t ; e S t ; h t ) are crucial to determine mobility in the two systems. A detailed discussions of this issue, and of the two functions, is developed in section 5.
The Typical History of a Dynasty
To get some intuition about the way in which the model works we can follow the typical path of a dynasty. After a failure in school of a given member, his son will have a belief ® on his own talent and a human capital equal to 1. Now for a sequence of periods the members of the dynasty will choose not to go to school because their self con¯dence is too low.
During these periods, however, the belief on talent grows (by the fact that the iterates of the updating rule 3.5 are increasing) until it reaches a critical level at which the corresponding member of the dynasty decides to go to school. For convenience we shall denote this critical level º ¤ P in the private school system and º ¤ S in the state school system case. This critical level, or, equivalently, the length of this initial sequence of periods will depend of course on the institutional arrangement and on the equilibrium; we discuss later how to characterise it, and the various additional factors that in°uence such critical level in the two systems.
In case of success in school and until a new failure occurs (in which case the cycle we have just described starts all over again) the dynasty goes through a sequence of better and better periods. In each of these periods the members go to school, acquire human capital in an increasing quantity and keep the belief to a high level. In the private school system the members devote an increasing amount of income to the education of their children; while in the state school system they vote for large tax rates in support of education. Eventually, however, a failure occurs and the cycle starts over.
Equilibria and Steady State Distributions
In this paper we shall concentrate our attention on the long run property of equilibria; and they can be easily studied by considering the invariant distribution on the relevant variables: human capital, beliefs over talent, investment in education and so on.
From our previous discussion of the typical history of a dynasty it should be clear that only certain beliefs over talent are possible in the long run, for a given critical belief. Each dynasty experiences a failure with certainty over an in¯nite time horizon. After this, the belief of the member of the dynasty in the next generation over his own talent at the moment of deciding about his schooling e®ort is ® (i.e. the probability of being di®erent from his parent). The following members update their beliefs® k ; k = 1; 2; : : : using 3.5 without going to school until the critical level is reached. At that point the corresponding member of the dynasty goes to school, talent is revealed and the belief can only go back to ® (in case of failure in school) where the cycle begins again, or to 1 ¡ ® (in case of success); from this last belief the only transitions possible are either to 1 ¡ ® again (success) or to ® (failure).
If the critical level is above 1=2 there are countably many beliefs possible; if it is below, then there are only¯nitely many. In both cases, however, they are a subset of the countable set f®;®;® 2 ; : : : ; 1 ¡ ®g. Note that, in turn, this will produce a countable set of possible human capital level, and of possible expenditures in education and of tax rates voted.
In order to examine the structure of the invariant distribution, the¯rst step is the de¯-nition of the appropriate state space: This state space has to be understood as follows. For the pair (º; h), º is the belief of a person on his own talent, at the moment in which he decides the schooling e®ort n; and h is the human capital that the same person has at the end of the schooling period. 34 The 34 See the CEPR WP version of this paper (n. 1466, October 1996), for a proof that this state space is a su±cient description of the process in the sense that the fact that a dynasty is in state x 2 X at time 0 provides su±cient information to describe the future conditions of the dynasty.
following Lemma describes formally the transition probabilities over this state space: let i be such that the belief® i is the critical belief, º ² from (® k¡1 ; 1) to (® k ; 1) for k = 0; : : : ; i ¡ 1, wp 1;
² from (® i ; 1) and (1 ¡ ®; 1) to (®; 1) wp 1;
² from (® i ; h 0 ) to (1 ¡ ®; h 1 ) wp 1 ¡ ®, and to (1 ¡ ®; 1) wp ®;
² from (1 ¡ ®; h j ) to (1 ¡ ®; h j+1 ) wp 1 ¡ ®, and to (1 ¡ ®; 1) wp ®.
The above transition probabilities imply that, after a failure and if it does not go to school, a dynasty moves with certainty across states characterized by a human capital equal to 1 and by subsequent updates of the belief on talent. When the dynasty reaches the critical level of self con¯dence it goes to school. Since the initial belief after a failure is correct, the updated belief on talent is equal to the true probability of being talented. Therefore, with probability® i the decision to go to school is succesful and h 0 human capital is accumulated; with probability 1 ¡® i , instead, the member of the dynasty is untalented and human capital remains equal to 1. If the dynasty keeps being succesful no more updating is needed because each subsequent member knows to be the o®spring of a talented parent. Therefore, with probability 1 ¡ ® the dynasty continues to be succesful and accumulate increasing human capital, while with probability ® it fails, human capital falls to 1 and the story starts all over.
The de¯nition and the computation of the invariant distribution for these transition probabilities is reported in the appendix 8.4. We discuss instead, in the next section, how the probabilities in the transition matrix, and therefore intergenerational mobility, depend on the type of school system.
Mobility
As we have seen, even on the reduced state space B£H the transition matrices are in¯nite: so we have to¯nd some simple index of the di®erent degrees of mobility in the two educational systems. The simplest is the transition probability among two di®erent classes of human capital.
We divide the total population in two classes: those who have a human capital equal to 1, the minimum value, and those who have a higher value. The¯rst class will be denoted by C 1 , the second by C 2 . We can then compute the transition matrix between these two classes, say p ij ; i = 1; 2; j = 1; 2, where p ij is the probability that a dynasty transits from C i to C j ; we have that:
Lemma 5.1 The matrix of transition probability across classes is:
is a decreasing function of i.
The proof is in appendix 8.5. Note that®
The value of® i i+1 can be considered an index of mobility at the steady state equilibrium of the system: the higher this value the more mobile the society is. Note that it is inversely related to the integer i, the number of periods a dynasty remains \discouraged" after a failure. We summarise this as our De¯nition of mobility: a society is more mobile, the shorter the period in which a discouraged dynasty does not attempt to acquire education; that is, the lower the value of the critical i (i.e. the lower the level of self-con¯dence needed to go to school).
We now turn to a discussion of this critical value and of how it is in°uenced by the institutional setting for education¯nancing.
Why Mobility Di®ers in the Two institutional Settings?
The critical value of i is the¯rst time after failure that the expected utility from a Y decision is higher than the expected utility of a N decision. In the private school system, for a father with belief º on his own talent and available quality of education e, the di®erence between these two expected utilities is given by the function:
where the term V (º) is equal to:
and the function L is de¯ned in the appendix 8.2. In the public school system, for the father with belief º on his own talent and available quality of education e, the di®erence between the expected utilities of the Y and N decisions is given by the function:
Mobility under the two systems di®ers whenever, coeteris paribus, the¯rst critical generation i for which D p becomes positive is di®erent from the¯rst critical generation i for which D s becomes positive. It is, therefore, crucial to consider how the two functions di®er for each given i.
One important di®erence is that a public school system transfers revenues from high income families to low income families and makes a better education available to the latter at no additional cost. This e®ect of a state system, that we label tranfer of resources, is commonly quoted as the main reason for which public education shoud raise intergenerational mobility.
But other factors, highlighted by our framework, point in the opposite direction making it possible for a private system to induce more mobility. First a father in the private system who decides his e®ort in the production of his own human capital also keeps into account the fact that in case of success the higher income available to him will also a®ect positively his son. In the public system instead a higher income will not have this e®ect, since the expense in education comes from a common fund, and the contribution of each person to it is negligible. Coeteris paribus, this makes the value of the Y choice higher in the private system, as re°ected by the coe±cient º[1 + (1 ¡ ®)] rather than º in front of log h t+1 in the two expressions 5.7 and 5.10; and it increases the e®ort spent in education in the public system (as it is clear from the equations 8.14 and 8.17 in the appendix). We call this factor e®ective altruism.
Furthermore, for a given i, the median tax rate in the public system is di®erent from the preferred tax rate according to which the critical parent would like to¯nance education for his son. In general the latter is larger than the former and this factor, that we label rate of expenditure, tends to reduce the transfer of resources factor and the capacity of a state system to increse mobility. 36 Finally, the fact that in the public system the tax rate is unique makes useless any information that a person may acquire on his and his son's personal abilities, because he cannot adjust the expense in education for the son according to this information. Formally this e®ect can be related to the presence of the term V (º) in the expression for D p ; this term is instead absent in the expression for D s because in the public system the tax rates in the three events Y and a success, Y and a failure, and N are the same. The opposite is true for a father in the private system as re°ected in the term V (º) in the expression for D p . We may call this term the value of information, which is due to the information acquired by going to school versus not going. If he goes to school, the father will know if his talent is high or low: hence he will know if the talent of the son is more likely high (with probability 1 ¡ ®) or more likely low (with probability ®). If he does not go, he will only have the information contained in his updated beliefô. But the function L in equation 5.8 is convex; so that we conclude that the value of information is always non negative and therefore increases the desirability of human capital investment in the private system. We can now summarise our comparison of the two functions D p and D s , i.e. of the factors that determine the critical decision to acquire human capital in the two systems. We have seen four factors that a®ect this critical decision. Three of them, the e®ective altruism, the rate of expenditure and the value of information, tend to make the private school system more mobile. The¯rst makes a higher income even more attractive for the father in the private system, thanks to the direct positive e®ect on the son. The second induces lower mobility in the state system by forcing a common lower tax rate, chosen by the median voter, on the critical voter. The third simply adds in the private system an additional reason to go to school: acquiring information on talent.
On the other side there is the transfer of resources factor. This factor captures the fact that taxation in public education systems transfers revenues from higher to lower income dynasties, increasing the quality of education available to the latter.
While the transfer of resources factor is important and is usually quoted as the reason for which public education systems should induce more mobility than private systems, the goal of our model is to show that the other three factors may be relevant as well. In the next section we compute numerical solutions of the model under the two institutional settings and we prove that, for plausible parameters values, a private education system may deliver more mobility than a public system if the technology for the accumulation of human capital is such that the transfer of resources e®ect is dominated by the other factors. In our simulations we are therefore able to reproduce and explain the puzzle o®ered by the comparison of education nancing and intergenerational mobility in Italy and in the US. Before looking at these simulations, however, we have to deal with an important special case.
A Borderline Case
The support of the invariant distribution is a countable set. In the computation of the median voter we begin to add from the lower tax rate, adding at each step discrete quantities corresponding to the di®erent types of voters. It may happen therefore that one of these sums corresponds exactly to half of the voters. This is typically an unlikely event; there is one case however that is particularly important, and requires a detailed discussion.
Suppose that the critical i, i.e. the¯rst time after a failure in which a dynasty tries to go to school, is zero. In the invariant distribution there would be exactly half of the population unskilled, with a most preferred tax rate equal to
, and exactly half skilled, with most preferred tax rate equal to
1¡® 1+(1¡®)
. In this case the equilibrium in voting does not exist.
In the numerical computations, we present however the results for the case in which the critical i is zero, and the tax rate is equal to
. We think the values we present are signi¯cant for the following reason.
Consider an economy in which the value of the parameters are such that with i = 0 exactly half of the population prefers the tax rate . This is not, at the corresponding stationary distribution, an equilibrium, because the proportion of population voting for the higher tax rate is not strictly larger than half. Consider however a path where the proportion of the population with human capital higher than 1 is larger than half, say ¹ 0 . Along the path the values of aggregate human capital and the distribution of human capital and belief converge to the values of an economy with tax rate equal to
. The transition is the one described in the previous lemma 5.1; so the fraction of population with belief higher or equal to 1 ¡ ® is equal to1 0 n in period n, a proportion strictly larger than half.
So along any such path, in every period, the economy is in an equilibrium in which the values of average human capital, its distribution among the population, and so on are close to the values that we report for the case of the critical i equal to 0, and tax rate equal to
.
Numerical computations
The goal of this section is to show that the model described in the previous pages may generate two paradigmatic cases: one in which a private education system induces more mobility than a public education system and one in which the opposite is true: both outcomes are possible depending on parameter values. The set of parameters under which the private system generates more mobility is such that the transfer of resources factor is dominated by the other three factors described in the previous section. This set can be considered as the one more likely to have generated the observed evidence concerning Italy and the US: it is therefore interpreted as our explanation of the puzzle.
In table 13 we present the relevant indicators that describe the performance of each education system, in the two di®erent paradigmatic cases. In both these cases the parameter ®, that measures the persistence in the transmission of talent, has been set equal to 0:1 while the scale parameter µ in the production function of human capital has been set equal to 2:8.
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The two paradigmatic cases di®er instead for the values of the parameters¯and°. These parameters measure, respectively, the elasticity of human capital accumulation with respect to e®ort (1 ¡ n t ) and with respect to the available quality of education e t .
Part A of table 13 shows that the main results of Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) hold also in our model. In both Case 1 and Case 2, the state system features a lower degree of inequality but also a lower total human capital (i.e. lower income) and a lower total expenditure in education. The median income in the upper class, that is a measure of inequality because income in the lower class is equal to 1 for everybody, is in fact larger in the private system independently from°and¯. The counterpart of this greater inequality is the larger accumulation of human capital and the larger expenditure in education that the private system can generate, thanks to the fact that fathers are free to spend what they prefer for the education of their sons on the basis of their income and their beliefs on talent. In the state system, instead, where the total quality of education is determined by the common tax rate decided by the median voter and by the aggregate amount of human capital, the total expenditure in education is lower.
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However, as we argued in the introduction, the comparison between private and public education systems cannot be limited to these performance indicators, as in Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) . A crucial aspect of the comparison is the relative capacity of the two systems to generate mobility and to reduce the mismatch between talents and education. While in the model of Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) this issue cannot be addressed, here we have the elements to compare the performance of the two systems from the point of view of mobility.
A common argument in defence of public schools is that they o®er a better quality of education to poor dynasties that, in a private system, would otherwise spend too little for the education of their children. The last column of Part A in table 13 con¯rms this intuition: the critical expenditure in education e t , reported in this column, is what the fathers of thē rst generation going to school spend for the education of their children. Table 13 shows that in both Case 1 and Case 2 the state system o®ers a better quality of education to this critical generation and this is an implication of the transfer of resources factor that we mentioned in the previous section. The reader will recall that this is indeed the factor that tends to favour mobility in a state system.
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But, the reader will also recall that other factors point in the opposite direction. Part B of table 13 shows indeed that the provision of a better quality of education to poor families does not necessarily make the state system more mobile than the private system: this because the o®er of equal educational opportunities to rich and poor dynasties does not generate greater mobility if such an o®er is not attractive for poor dynasties.
The paradigmatic case in which the state system fails to generate more mobility even if it o®ers a better quality of education to poor families, is Case 1 in which¯= 0:3 and°= 0:1. Table 13 shows that in this case the probability of upward mobility is higher in the private system (0:09 ) than in the state system (0:05). A greater level of self con¯dence (i.e. the critical belief) is needed in the state system in order to go to school (0:42 versus 0:18) and seven generations (instead of one in the private system) wait after a failure without going to school before self con¯dence becomes su±ciently high to try the human capital investment.
In this case the public o®er of equal educational opportunities is not su±cient to ensure more social mobility because the relative weight°of the quality of education in the production function for human capital is too low. As a result the transfer of resources e®ect, that tends to increase mobility in a state system, is dominated by the other three factors, mentioned in the previous section, that tend to increase mobility in a private system: e®ective altruism, the rate of expenditure and the value of information.
On the contrary, in Case 2, when¯= 0:1 and°= 0:6, the quality of education is so important for the accumulation of human capital that the public system is capable to induce greater mobility: the reason is that this is precisely the situation in which the public o®er of a better education to poor families makes the investment in human capital convenient. In this second paradigmatic case, while the relative performance of the two systems in terms of inequality, total human capital accumulation and expenditure in education is unchanged (see Part A of table 13), no generation waits without going to school in the state system because a belief of 0:1 is enough. In the private system instead the level of self con¯dence has to grow up to 0:34 and 4 generations wait without going to school. As a result the probability of upward mobility is 0:10 in the state system and 0:07 in the private system.
Increasing the values of the parameters ® and µ (that is, making the transmission of talent more random and increasing coeteris paribus the accumulation of human capital in case of success in school) makes mobility more likely in both systems but does not change their qualitative relative performance in relations to the values of¯and°. This is clear from our characterisation of the mobility matrix in section 5: when the talent of the child is independent of the talent of the parent, this matrix has all identical rows, irrespective of the values of the parameters and of the schooling system.
To summarise the results of our numerical computations, in order for the transfer of resources factor to prevail, making the state system more mobile, two main conditions have to be met. First redistribution of educational resources from rich to poor dynasties has to be high enough to ensure a su±ciently better quality of education for poor dynasties; and this is the common argument supporting the idea that state systems should generate more upward mobility. But second, the quality of education has to be relatively important, with respect to individual e®ort, in the accumulation process for human capital. This second requirement is what our paper highlights.
The centralised and uniform provision of education to poor dynasties fails to generate mobility if the quality of education is relatively unimportant for the accumulation of human capital. If this accumulation depends more on individual e®ort (a large¯relative to°), the o®er of equal educational opportunities is of little value for poor families. In this case a private decentralised system in which parents are free to decide how much to spend for the education of their children generates more mobility than a state system in which poor families have access to a better education system but have fewer incentives to do it.
In the light of this model, the lower mobility characterising the Italian public education system in comparison to the US private system suggests that individual e®ort is relatively more important than the quality of education in the process of accumulation of human capital that characterises these countries: the set of parameters described in Case 1 is the set that appears to be most likely given the \two data points" o®ered by the comparison.
Conclusions
If one of the goals of a public education system is to favour equal opportunities of social mobility, the Italian schooling system failed to achieve this goal. The centralised and public structure of education¯nancing in Italy has indeed ensured a substantial uniformity of the quantity and quality of education o®ered to both rich and poor families; but despite this o®er of equal opportunities Italy, in comparison to the US, displays lower intergenerational mobility not only in terms of occupations but also in terms of education levels.
The fact that family background is a more important determinant of individual social fortunes in Italy than in the US is particularly puzzling given that in the US a large fraction of the expenditures for education is¯nanced locally. From the viewpoint of this paper this is the distinctive feature that makes the US education system intrinsically private. Indeed, because of local¯nancing (i) the quality of the education which is supplied in the US is signi¯cantly di®erent according to the (perhaps implicit) price paid for it; and (ii) the quality of the education provided to the child is decided by the parent on the basis of this cost. In the US the quality of the pre-college education is signi¯cantly di®erent in di®erent neighbourhoods and it has an implicit price in the property tax paid by residents and in the higher price of the houses in the best neighbourhoods. The choice of the location of residence is clearly in large part a choice of the education provided to the child. A fortiori for college education for which in addition to local¯nancing, US families have access to a large number of private universities. The fact that in such a system family background is less important than in a system in which education is centralised and public is the puzzle that this paper has addressed.
Our explanation of this puzzle starts from the consideration of self con¯dence as one of the driving forces of upward social mobility. Self con¯dence has to be greater than a critical value in order for poor dynasties to be willing to make an investment in human capital. Poor dynasties coming from a history of failure or lack of investment in education have lower self con¯dence and may not invest. As a result, a society may have in equilibrium talented people with low education.
Public education systems can be thought as being motivated, among other reasons, by the goal of increasing self con¯dence in poor dynasties so that talented but poor children may reach higher education levels and skilled occupations. The way to achieve this goal is generally to o®er a uniform quality of education to all citizens, so that poor families have the same opportunities of rich families to invest in the education of their children. But our analysis shows that an o®er of equal educational opportunities may not generate more mobility if the incentive to use education as a way to climb the social ladder is low. Under plausible conditions, even if the quality of education o®ered to poor dynasties by the state system is higher than the quality o®ered by a private system, the investment in education may be more attractive for poor dynasties in the private system.
What makes an educational investment attractive in a private system is essentially the possibility to use the outcome of this investments for the bene¯t of future members of the dynasty. In a private system the information on talent acquired in school can be used to chose optimally the fraction of income to be left to the future generation in the form of education, while in a state system this fraction is decided by the median voter; in addition, in a private system, the higher income that one obtains in school in case of success, bene¯ts directly the next generation because for a given rate of expenditure in education of the father, the actual education quality received by the son is larger. These factors tend to favour mobility in a private system, while in a state system mobility is favoured by the redistribution of resources from rich to poor dynasties .
Therefore, whether a centralised and uniform education system induces more or less mobility than a decentralised and private one depends on e®ects pointing in opposite directions. Our model shows that a state system generates less mobility when the quality of education is relatively less important than individual e®ort in the accumulation of human capital. In this case, even if the cost of schooling is low in the state system, the \dynastic" return to schooling is also low and the o®er of a better quality of education to poor families has little value to them. This is instead the case in which a private system does a better job in raising the \dynastic" return to schooling, thereby making the investment in human capital attractive even for poor families.
Another way to look at the policy implications of our paper is to observe that primary education is a process of human capital accumulation in which the quality of education (as opposed to individual e®ort) is relatively important: therefore a public school system may induce more educational investment. On the contrary, tertiary education is a process in which e®ort is relatively more important and the higher quality of education o®ered to poor families by a public system does not compensate for the lack of \dynastic" attractiveness of the educational investment. This could be the case of the Italian public university system, whose uniform and low quality does not attract the expected educational investment of poor families because it does not o®er a real opportunity for talented children to emerge.
Our data are not rich enough to prove that the public and centralised nature of the education system is the main reason for the low degree of social mobility in Italy in comparison to the US: the existence of a non competitive labour market is certainly an additional crucial factor. But we believe that our explanation is important if one wants to address the policy issues raised in the debate on the reform of public education systems.
It looks like a paradox, but in a world in which family networks are important for labour market success, a centralised and uniform quality of education, far from helping poor children, takes away from them a fundamental tool to prove their talent, to distinguish themselves and to compete with rich children, whether talented or not.
Appendices

The data
As far as Italy is concerned, our data come from a national survey conducted in 1985 by a group of Italian universities: the Indagine Nazionale sulla Mobilit ¶ a Sociale). A representative sample of 5016 individuals aged between 18 and 65 was interviewed on their working life, their social attitudes and their family background. From this¯le, we extracted information concerning the status of the respondent in 1985 and his/her family when he/she was 14. Therefore, while respondents are observed in the same year (1985) , their parents are observed in di®erent years, ranging in principle from 1934 to 1981.
From the original sample we excluded all individuals not belonging to the labour force or whose occupation was unknown. In addition, for comparability with the US sample (see below), we excluded all women and all individuals younger than 25; this latter restriction is justi¯ed by the fact that we want to allow for the possibility of completing university curricula. With these restrictions the original sample reduces to 1666 son-father couples; their age distribution is reported in table 1. The average age of each generation is similar and note that some parents were born during the 19th century.
US data comes, instead, from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), that consists of a longitudinal sample of families interviewed for the¯rst time in 1968 and then followed on a yearly basis. The subsample that we use is an extract of the original sample containing information on 1050 father-son couples, whose occupation was known and whose age was greater than 25 at the time of the interview.
An important di®erence between the two datasets is that US data are based on direct interviews to both sons and fathers, while Italian data on fathers are based on sons' recollections. Information on US sons were collected in 1990, while information on corresponding fathers refer to 1974. Because of the short interval between the two interviews, US sons are on average considerably younger than their fathers as shown in table 1. Although this feature of our data clearly generates a bias we believe that this bias reinforces our conclusions. If Italian children are on average older, they should have had more time to get rid of the e®ects of an unfavourable family background. Vice-versa, family background should be more important in the US where children are observed earlier in their careers. This because we expect family networking to be more important at the beginning of a career than at the end. Yet, even if the bias in the data increases the likelihood of¯nding family background more important in the US, we¯nd that it is more important in Italy.
In each country we consider the median income paid by each occupation as the indicator of individual long term economic status. As described in the text, we then group individuals in four classes constructed according to occupational income intervals. We then study mobility tables describing the probability of an intergenerational transition between the four classes.
It should be noted that we have not yet found a single classi¯cation of elementary occupations applicable to both countries, nor a conversion table from the national classi¯cations into a common international one. For Italy our data set is based on the occupation classi¯ca-tion developed by DeLillo- Schizzerotto (1985) , who grouped 13.000 elementary occupations into 97 basic groups, characterised by a similar degree of social desirability (as measured by the ranking obtained in sample interviews). For the US, we rely on the classi¯cation scheme developed by Duncan (1961) , who estimated an index of social prestige (based on income and educational achievement) starting from a subgroup of occupations whose social desirability was estimated through direct interviews. In this case the classi¯cation scheme include 96 basic groups. Therefore we have a comparable number of occupational groups for the two countries, and these groups were created with similar methodologies, namely on the basis of a homogeneous degree of social desirability. But note that the ranking between occupations in the two countries does not need to be the same.
As far as occupational incomes are concerned, for the US sample we have information about the earnings of both generations. On the contrary, in the Italian sample, we do not have any direct information about incomes. We therefore merged occupational income data from another source according to the following procedure.
We started with incomes taken from the 1987 wave of the Indagine sui Bilanci delle Famiglie Italiane run by the Bank of Italy. Since this survey reports net incomes, we have estimated the corresponding gross incomes on the basis of the relevant¯scal legislation for 1987. 40 We then estimated an earning function using gross incomes. Regressors in the earning function were: age, 6 education dummies, 9 quali¯cation dummies, 11 sector dummies and 5 geographic dummies. We used the estimated parameters to predict incomes for the individuals in our main sample. From these predicted individual incomes we constructed the occupational ranking based on the median income of each occupation. This procedure could of course be used only for the generation of sons. Therefore we were forced to use also for fathers the occupational ranking constructed for sons. In order to allow for a meaningful comparison, we imposed the same restriction on the US dataset as well. But in this data set we have been able to check that the ranking of occupations in terms of median incomes is fairly stable across generations: the correlation between occupational incomes constructed on the distribution of sons and on the distribution of fathers is equal to 0:78.
As far as the educational levels are concerned, we have classi¯ed in the high education group all those individuals holding a college degree or a PhD degree in the US sample, or having obtained a laurea or a dottorato di ricerca in the Italian sample. This classi¯cation corresponds to the UNESCO classi¯cation ISCED 6 and ISCED 7, and requires 18 and 16 years of school attendance, respectively in the two countries. People who attended some years of college without obtaining any degree where not considered as college degree holders. 41 In the case of Italy we have also used an alternative classi¯cation scheme (see table 11 ): in this case we have included in the high education group all those individuals holding at least a diploma di maturit ¶ a degree i.e. a secondary school degree corresponding to ISCED 5 classi¯cation scheme; in such a case the minimum number of years of school attendance is 15.
A useful function
The following optimization problem appears repeatedly in our paper:
log(x ¡ y) + z log y:
Its solution is y = z 1+z
x, and the value is:
where we have denoted:
In order to lighten the presentation, we often refer to this function in the paper.
First period optimal policies
We begin with the private school system. The agent born at t is comparing the maximum between two quantities. The¯rst is the expected maximum utility from the choice (Y; n t ) today, assuming that in the following period the agent will make the optimal choice (of consumption and expenditure on education for the son) conditional on the new information about his own and the son's talent. With belief º t on his own talent the¯rst choice gives a success with probability º t and failure with probability 1 ¡ º t . If we substitute the values of the second period in the utility function 3.2 and write the maximisation problem for thē rst period we get:
The optimal choice of leisure is
and the value is
The second quantity we need to consider is the expected maximum utility from a choice N today. The e®ort does not a®ect the human capital, so the optimal choice of leisure is 1; the belief on the son will beô t , and the corresponding value has the very simple form:
The reasoning in the case of the state school system is similar. The agent solves:
where the tax rate ¿ is the prevailing tax rate (and not the tax rate chosen in the second period by the agent). The optimal choice of leisure is 1 1 + º¯ ( 8.17) and the value is
The Invariant Distribution
In this section we provide the values of the invariant distribution over the state space B £ H, for a given value® i of the critical belief. We denote by ¦, respectively §, the transition matrix in the private, respectively state, system; ¦(x; x 0 ) is the probability of the transition from x to x 0 . An equilibrium invariant distribution is a probability F ¤ that reproduces itself, when each person makes the optimal choice. More formally we say: De¯nition 8.1 A steady state equilibrium distribution for the private school system is a probability measure F ¤ P over the product space B £ H such that
ii. each member of each dynasty is choosing e®ort and school expenditure optimally, according to the functions (D P ; e P ) of section 3.
Similarly we say:
De¯nition 8.2 A steady state equilibrium distribution for the state school system is a triple (¿ ¤ ; e ¤ ; F ¤ S ) of a tax rate, an average education quality and a probability measure F ¤ S over the product space of beliefs and human capital such that (F S;H is the marginal of F S over H):
iii. ¿ ¤ is the median voter tax rate for F ¤ S :
iv. each member of the each dynasty is choosing e®ort and vote on tax rate optimally, according to the functions (D S ; ¿ S ) of section 3.
Using the equations above we get:
that we can solve to get¯nally:
where q = P 1 0 (q j ) is the fraction of the population with human capital greater than 1 and (i + 1)p is the fraction of the population with human capital equal to 1.
Proofs
Proof of lemma 5.1. Let F be an invariant distribution for the process described by the matrix ¡. From the ergodic theorem, the measure of the set of dynasty histories with two consecutive values of 1 of human capital is given by:
From our computation of the invariant distribution we derive that the above quantity is equal to:
while the total fraction of population with human capital 1 is p(i + 1): Taking ratios and using the value for p and q in the appendix 8.4 we get the result. The proof for the other row is obvious.
Recall now that®
proves the second claim.
Proof that the proportion of unskilled is larger than half when i 6 = 0 (see footnote 36).
The statement is equivalent to (i + 1)p > 1=2 which in turn is equivalent to:
; so this is equivalent to:
Call 2® = x and i + 1 = n to simplify; and observe that
n has derivative at zero equal to (¡n), and is strongly convex. Then since f (x) > f (0)+ f 0 (0)x for every strongly convex function, and the above expression is exactly 8.23.
Numerical Computation
In this appendix we describe the procedure to compute the long run equilibrium. We begin with the private school system. The procedure checks for each integer i if the corresponding belief® i is the critical belief of an equilibrium distribution. Recall that a critical belief is the least belief such that the member of a dynasty with that belief decides to go to school.
In the previous section we have determined the steady state equilibrium proportion of the population for the di®erent beliefs. Note that there are several types of people having the belief 1¡®; namely, those whose dynasty has had a sequence of one, two, and so on successes. These types will have di®erent level of human capital. We now proceed to determine these levels and the corresponding proportions. Let us begin with the¯rst. After the critical level® i is reached, the member of the dynasty goes to school. The father had a human capital equal to 1, a belief on his own talent equal to® (i¡1) , and has invested e =® i 1+® i in the education of the son.
The son invests the optimal amount of e®ort given these characteristics, and succeeds with probability® i . If he does, he has a human capital of
Similar arguments give that the dynasties with j consecutive successes in the past have level of human capital that follows the di®erence equation
for j = 1; : : :. We have conjectured so far that the integer i determines a critical belief® i . The last step of the procedure is to verify this conjecture. If it is, we have found a steady state equilibrium; if it is not, we proceed to the next integer. To verify the conjecture we have to check that the belief® i is indeed the least one for which people go to school. But the di®erence in expected utility between the two choices Y and N for a person with belief º on his own talent, expenditure e decided by the father and human capital 1 of the father is given by the function D p . The¯nal step is now obvious:¯nd the least integer i such that
The procedure to determine the steady state equilibrium for the state school system is similar, and we provide here the main lines. In this case too we check if® i is the critical belief of the equilibrium, for every i. Recall now that the preferred level of taxes only depends on the belief of the father at the moment of voting. A simple computation now determines the median voter in this population, and the winning tax rate ¿ (® i ). Also arguments like the one given above give the human capital for generations with j successes. The equations are now:
and
for j = 1; : : :. The e in the formulas for human capital above is for the moment a parameter to be determined. Keeping into account that the proportion of population with h 0 is p® i , and the proportion of population with h j is q®(1 ¡ ®) j for every j > 0 we can now determine the aggregate human capital and therefore the aggregate income, this last as a function of e (besides i), H(i; e) say. Now solving for e in
determines a value of the education quality level in the state school system e(i), say. Thē nal step is, as before, the determination of the integer i for which indeed the belief® i is the critical level. The function giving the di®erence between the expected utility of the Y and the N decision, for person with father having a human capital equal to 1 is now given by: the function D s , and as before we conclude by determining the least integer i such that D s (® i ; e(i))¸0: Note: statistics based on the distribution of sons' incomes; results are similar for the distribution of fathers. Minimum occupational income normalized to 100. Income classes are de¯ned as intervals of equal size of the (log) di®erence between the highest and the lowest occupational incomes. Note: each cell contains the row-to-column transition probability. C1-C4 are income classes de¯ned as intervals of equal size of the (log) di®erence between the highest and the lowest occupational incomes. Note: each cell contains the row-to-column transition probability. C1-C4 are income classes de¯ned as intervals of equal size of the (log) di®erence between the highest and the lowest occupational incomes. Note: j¸2j is the modulus of the second greater eigenvalue; tr(P ) and det(p) are respectively the trace and the determinant of the interclass transition matrix P ; k is the number of classes; f ij is the joint frequency in cell (i; j); the distance ji ¡ jj is the number of class borders crossed in the transition from i to j. jW i ¡ W j j is the percentage di®erence between median incomes of class i and j. Note: Maximum likelihood estimates of a probit model in which the dependent variable takes value 1 when the son is in income class 3 or 4. The table reports the probability e®ects, evaluated at the sample averages, due to a discrete change of each dummy independent variable. For the age controls the reported e®ects are those of an in¯nitesimal age change. Note: marginal and limiting distributions are referred to the matrices of educational transition probabilities. Each limiting distribution is obtained under the assumption that the correspndent matrix describes a Markov process. For Italy: high education = college degree in column 1 and high school degree or more in column 2; for the US: high education = college degree. Note: each cell contains the row-to-column transition probability. E1 = no college degree; E2 = completed college degree. Note: each cell contains the row-to-column transition probability. E1 = no college degree; E2 = completed college degree. Note: each cell contains the row-to-column transition probability. E1 = less than highschool; E2 = completed highschool or more. table 6 are all equal; tr(P ) is the trace of the interclass transition matrix P ; k is the number of classes; f ij is the joint frequency in cell (i; j); the distance ji ¡ jj is the number of borders crossed in the transition from i to j. Note: All the indicators are computed at the steady state for: ® = 0:1 and µ = 2:8. The median income of the upper class is a measure of inequality in these economies given that all the individuals in the lower class have an income equal to 1. Total human capital is de¯ned as in equation 3.1. Total expenditure in education is the sum of what each father spends for the education of his son in the private system, while in the state system is given by de¯nition 8.2. The critical expenditure in education is the education available to the generation that goes to school: it is equal to total expenditure in the state system becase of the the normalization of population. The proportion of unskilled is equal to p(1 + i) as in section 8.4. The probability of upward mobility is equal to the term® i i+1 in lemma 5.1. The critical beliefs are the beliefs º ¤ P or º ¤ S , respectively for the private and the state system, that dynasties have to reach after a history of no schooling in order to decide to make an investment in education. The¯rst generation in school after a failure is the value of the critical i as characterized, for example, in lemma 4.2.
